Credit, Hoover Institution/Reproduction
North American economist John Cochrane had never interacted so much with Brazil as he has in recent days.
Quoted several times in the article in which economist André Lara Resende proposed the creation of a monetary and fiscal policy council to work alongside the Central Bank (BC), producing interest, spending and investment targets, he saw his email inbox fill with comments from Brazilian colleagues reinforcing or diverging from Lara Resende's proposal, which has been mobilizing the country's economic debate since the beginning of the month.
A researcher at the Hoover Institution, a research center linked to the prestigious Stanford University, in California, in the United States, Cochrane tends to remain on the fence about the project, but, in this interview with BBC News Brasil, he lets some structural impressions escape.
The main one: Lara Resende's idea would only work with a long-term fiscal adjustment, capable of generating permanent primary surpluses — and to do so, the logic of spending on social programs would have to be reviewed.
"If the Central Bank lowers the interest rate, will it be enough to bring [the country] to fiscal sustainability? Can it solve the problem alone? That's where I'm a little skeptical", he points out, agreeing with the Brazilian economist.
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"It would require a fiscal adjustment, because the problem is not just the interest rate. If we think through the logic of multiple equilibrium, jumping from here to there, there has to be sustainable in itself. It seems to me that this is not the case in Brazil."
For Cochrane, the structure and incentives of social programs present distortions that must be corrected. "It's not telling grandma that she's going to have to live on half the money she's used to. There's a lot you can do without being cruel," he says.
One of them would be to review the design of each social program, in order to guarantee public aid only to the most vulnerable. Another, listed by the economist, would be to change the mechanism for adjusting benefits for inflation, as is the case with the minimum wage in Brazil, indexed to the National Consumer Price Index (INPC) and which also takes into account economic growth two years earlier.
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"Don't increase the minimum wage. Get rid of it," he says.
These perceptions advance in relation to the comments about Brazil that he made in two articles published on his profile on Substack, a newsletter platform, in recent days. In the first, he responded directly to Lara Resende, calling the proposal "sophisticated", but raising doubts about its effectiveness.
In the second, he shows small analyzes that he has received from Brazilian economists since then, especially with fiscal data.
According to the Central Bank, in the period of one year until September 2026, Brazil recorded a primary deficit of 0.52% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This account, which disregards interest on public debt, means that federal, state and municipal governments spent more resources than they collected during this period.
The nominal deficit, which includes interest payments, was 9.51% of GDP.
This is why André Lara Resende defends an institutional design that works to lower the basic interest rate, the Selic, currently at 13.75% per year. With this fall, the nominal deficit would also fall.
The last time the country had a surplus, that is, it collected more than it spent, was in May 2025: 0.15% of GDP in the primary balance.
In the conversation with BBC News Brasil, Cochrane repeated praise and criticism in equal proportion. "[Lara Resende's proposal] is the kind of thing that the political community, the international standard will say: 'what a silly idea'. It makes more sense than it seems, but I think it's a little dangerous."
Author of a monetary equation relevant to the global economic debate, the fiscal theory of the price level — the title of the book he published in 2023, by Princeton University, in the USA —, in addition to being a professor at the University of Chicago, in Michigan, recognized for its strongly liberal menu, Cochrane observes the administration of Javier Milei, in Argentina, as a possible parameter.
According to him, by using the "famous chainsaw", the symbol that the Argentine president adopted throughout his electoral campaign in 2023, to express his agenda of deep spending cuts — including "dynamiting the Central Bank" —, Milei shows how a robust fiscal adjustment impacts a very inflated economy.
"They came close to hyperinflation and, when Milei came to power [in 2023], he transformed a 5% deficit [of GDP] into a surplus practically overnight. Inflation fell to 2% per month — as much as he wanted — and interest rates fell. The fiscal part came first, but interest rates fell very quickly, to the 6% you mentioned. Much better than they were before," he explains.
Read the main excerpts from the interview below.
Credit, Senado Agency
BBC News Brasil — Economist André Lara Resende proposes the creation of a monetary and fiscal policy council that, in parallel to the Central Bank, would be responsible for defining targets for interest and investments. The article he wrote mentions your work a lot, but in the first evaluation you published, days later, you said that the idea works "more in theory than in practice". Why?
John Cochrane — Everything that works in theory works in practice. I don't like that distinction. In fact, we need theories that are more applicable to [each] situation. He [André Lara Resende] is absolutely right in saying that fiscal and monetary policies must work together to solve the fiscal problem, to bring down the interest rate and avoid excessive inflation.
The fiscal problem will not be resolved with one or two years of surpluses, but rather with the confidence of those who are buying Brazilian bonds or who have investments in Brazil that, in the long term, the debt will be paid and the country will not return to a context of high inflation, moratorium, capital controls or any of these disorders that happened in the past.
[To answer] if the goals and advice [proposed by Lara Resende] are good enough, the important thing is to point out their objective. If achieved, long-term interest rates will fall, the exchange rate will rise and confidence will return. The question is whether the details of the proposal include enough fiscal pre-commitment to keep people safe.
BBC News Brasil — The implementation of the proposal depends on a fiscal adjustment, then.
Cochrane — There is a basic truth [in the proposal]: that Brazil pays very high real interest on its debt and that this is the driving force behind the current fiscal problem. The central question, then, is: what to do? If the Central Bank lowers the interest rate, will it be enough to bring [the country] to fiscal sustainability? Can he solve the problem alone? That's where I'm a little skeptical.
Theoretically, anything is possible, but, yes, it would require a fiscal adjustment, because the problem is not just the interest rate. If we think through the logic of multiple balance, jumping from here to there, there has to be sustainable in itself. It seems to me that this is not the case in Brazil. The new fiscal council, with new rules, can make this a reality. It just needs to be solid. The question is how much the Central Bank can guide the country or whether it would be left behind once the fiscal is under control.
BBC News Brasil — How big would this adjustment be?
Cochrane — Whatever is necessary [to adjust], as long as it's not just for a few years. It is necessary to have small and reliable surpluses in better times [of the economy] or a very small primary deficit. Then everyone will know that the debt will be paid with these small and reliable surpluses. This generates confidence so that, in the next crisis, [the country] borrows more money and promises other small primary surpluses.
In Brazil, as in the United States, resolving the promises of social programs is what is really important, because what worries people is whether it will be possible to pay this debt. This is really the built-in social spending [in the public budget] that is very difficult for our economies to finance.
In the case of Brazil, strong economic growth would allow everyone to see that, yes, the debt will be paid. It would be enough to return primary surpluses beyond one or two years. However, the entire world is facing this dilemma. Brazil is just one step ahead.
BBC News Brasil — In your last article about Brazil, you admitted that you had doubts about whether the growth trajectory of public debt would decrease even with the lower basic interest rate, as Lara Resende argues. What's your point?
Cochrane — Suppose the Central Bank lowers the interest rate. In the short term, the question would be: what will happen to inflation? Then I agree with Lara Resende that people know less about the subject than they think they do.
We would have three possibilities. One of them would be for inflation to soar. It is the conventional macroeconomic concern. Paradoxically, this would be good for public debt and the deficit in the short term, because rising prices would eat away at part of the debt. But Brazil is very familiar with this and knows that it doesn't end well: it even solves the fiscal problem in the short term, but things get worse quickly afterwards.
The second possibility is that, as interest rates fall, inflation would also fall. It would be perfect. The Fisherian possibility [by North-American economist Irving Fischer] that modern theories point to. The problem is that real interest rates would remain high and would not help [contain] the debt. It's a gamble to believe that cutting interest rates would leave inflation untouched and only affecting debt — and even then it wouldn't last long.
It is therefore necessary that the combination of debt interest costs and surpluses be sufficient to pay the debt. [For this], we would need decades of low interest rates — which I don't think the Central Bank [of Brazil] could provide. Furthermore, if politicians suddenly lowered interest rates and saw the effects of this on the debt, they would probably spend even more.
This is why the fiscal part is so important and why a fiscal council would be part of this. An agreement between the Central Bank and a fiscal [council] in which both saw the importance of each doing their part. The big risk is going from 9% real interest rates to 2% and then the government saying: "Great! Let's spend this money!" It would undermine everything.
BBC News Brasil — You are quite skeptical that States can control spending. What validates this perception?
Cochrane — My armchair empiricism.
But why did every country — the US, Europe, the UK, everyone — go on a money-lending binge these past 20 years? The fact that markets are lending to them at low interest rates certainly has something to do with it, and governments are also finding higher interest rates now. I hope this makes them wake up. In the US, many people said that very low interest rates were only possible because of the FED [Federal Reserve, the US central bank]. They are the same people who, now, should be at Lara Resende's side saying that Brazil should go back to that: zero interest or very low rates. Opinions change when times change.
BBC News Brasil — Many economists aligned with the Lula government point out that increasing debt to increase investment is a good economic strategy. What is your analysis on this?
Cochrane — You asked at the beginning about theories and the real world, right? If you take on more debt and invest in something that actually generates economic growth, and then that real economic growth produces more tax revenue in the future that pays off the debt, it's perfect.
It's the same thing if an entrepreneur takes out a loan to open a startup that then generates profits to pay off its initial debt. But does this theory work in the real world? You have to analyze the Brazilian case to answer me. I'm quite skeptical when the US government makes claims like this. Do you believe that politicians have a better read than investors on where investments will produce real income?
Get this: I live in California. Our big public investment here is a high-speed train that, so far, has cost US$30 billion [R$165 billion], but there is still no track installed. When ready, it will connect two small towns that no one has ever heard of. It is not a large public investment. The theory is beautiful. Now, how good is the Brazilian State at making investments that are not only useful, but that generate enough revenue to pay for them later? This is a question of political economy rather than just an economic one.
Credit, Bloomberg via Getty Images
BBC News Brasil — After receiving so many analyzes from Brazilian colleagues and evaluating the proposal that Lara Resende made, what is your perception?
Cochrane — I would need an hour to respond. It's the kind of thing that the political community, the international standard will say, "what a silly idea." It makes more sense than it seems, but I think she's a little dangerous.
The important thing is that interest costs on debt are a big problem — and the Central Bank really can't solve it alone, although it's not as obvious as everyone says. This points, then, to the fact that fiscal and monetary stabilization would work better than it seems, because it would bring the fiscal part back on track reliably.
The Central Bank could lower the interest rate without inflation, and this would multiply the tax benefits. [The country] would stop paying such high interest on the debt. I see it as an interesting multiplier effect.
But there is a lot of uncertainty and I don't know Brazil in depth. I'll leave you with the standard economist answer, "on the one hand this, on the other hand that", but with this dose of uncertainty. But there is a question: will the fiscal side really contain spending and lead to constant primary surpluses? It's a practical implementation that I don't know about.
BBC News Brasil — Would it work in the USA, where you live, for example?
Cochrane — No.
BBC News Brasil — Why?
Cochrane — Because the US has a chaotic budget process. The idea of a council setting budget goals, that that would mean something to Congress — given the current situation in Congress.
I think we would need something more explicit than that if we are to commit to long-term fiscal reform, which includes social program reforms. The US is very good at producing reports that recommend long-term goals that are then thrown in the trash.
In the end, we need the same thing as you: control our long-term fiscal situation, which means, in practice, controlling the benefits of social programs, in addition to controlling the amount of money that goes down the drain. Something worth US$ 1 trillion. The proposal [from Lara Resende] was very vague about what the tax part would be.
BBC News Brasil — O senhor também menciona que muitos países já tentaram conter seus juros básicos diante de problemas fiscais, mas que esse tipo de estratégia nunca funcionou. However, besides Turkey, whose case is best known, where else did this happen and what were the results?
Cochrane — [Where it happened] they weren't good. The problem is not financing deficits — and Brazil has small primary deficits — but lowering interest costs on debt.
The other name we give to this is financial repression. When does the strategy of lowering interest rates to slow down debt costs turn into "let's force people to keep holding government bonds, through low interest rates, because we are worried about financing?" This happened several times in the United States, in Latin America, in Europe, in Türkiye, which you mentioned. This is how wars are financed.
In World War II, the US kept interest rates very low and forced everyone to buy bonds. In parallel, they imposed price controls that later led to high post-war inflation. Between 1947 and 1951, in the Fed's agreement with the Treasury, the Fed was required to maintain interest rates at 2.5% to support long-term bond prices. The country was not financing its large deficits there, but containing interest costs on the debt. It generated inflation and demanded that the agreement itself be made. It's a historical pattern: when there are current deficits, large debts, a package emerges with a drop in interest rates, maintenance of government bonds by banks, capital and exchange controls, etc. All devices to force people to support the public debt. This lasts until it's no longer possible, and then everything explodes — even worse — later.
And I can't remember how many times Brazil tried to solve its fiscal and inflationary problems by containing interest rates and the result was this: it exploded.
BBC News Brasil — Brazil's real interest rate, at almost 9%, is the highest in the world today, ahead of Turkey (7.77%), a country in deep fiscal adjustment, Argentina (6.80%) and another at war, Russia (6.57%). Why does this happen? Do these countries share something?
Cochrane — Argentina is a good example, because they came close to hyperinflation and, when Milei came to power, he transformed a 5% deficit [of GDP] into a surplus practically overnight. Inflation fell to 2% per month — as much as he wanted — and interest rates fell. The fiscal part came first, but interest rates fell very quickly, to that 6% you mentioned. Much better than it was before.
That's an excellent question. What explains these 9% of Brazil? Is it a perfectly functioning economy in which everyone believes that the debt will be paid, but even so, the Central Bank keeps the interest rate artificially high? If so, why aren't all the hedge funds [investments made by people who, in search of quick returns, taking on greater risks] in the world, lending dollars and investing in Brazil?
The interest rate in the US is 5.5%, and inflation is 3.7%. You could get money in the USA, invest in Brazil and make a hell of a fortune. But they're not doing that. Why? Because investors are clearly worried about possible high inflation, devaluation, some type of moratorium, capital controls, something that will hinder them.
This 9% in Brazil is not the rate for a normal market. It contains a large premium for possible problems that may happen ahead.
BBC News Brasil — But is this particular to Brazil?
Cochrane — No. It happens everywhere. Switzerland has a 1% interest rate. How is this possible at the same time that Brazil is paying 9%? Because people who are looking at the Swiss currency believe that it can appreciate and are therefore willing to give them money, anticipating a good chance of getting [the money] back with this 1% increase. It's the best way to understand these very high real rates.
BBC News Brasil — But this rate can also be attractive.
Cochrane — It's a terrible enigma. If Brazil doesn't inflate, doesn't default, doesn't control the flow of capital, then this 9% will just be money thrown away. The high rate exists due to the fear that something will go wrong. If that doesn't happen, it's a real cost to the government. It's like watching the house next door burn down and buying your own house. They will charge you a big premium. But if your house doesn't burn down, however, the prize will just be wasted money.
I think actually reassuring people that things won't go wrong would make their insurance premiums go down by itself. The question still open in the economy is: how far [would it fall]? Furthermore, perhaps there is a kernel of truth to this story that these are just artificially high rates and that for some reason international capital is not flowing and the central bank can lower them for a period of time. How much and for how long? Open question.
BBC News Brasil – Is there any credibility there? One of the arguments that is repeated both in your texts and in those of Lara Resende is that the proposal would depend on trust in institutions.
Cochrane — Yes. Switzerland is paying 1% interest. The Swiss are pathologically frugal. The rest of the world wants them to print francs and so they hand over chunks [of money] to them. This makes the Swiss currency incredibly expensive, in addition to the debt brakes they have.
The United States had a very good fiscal policy between 1945 and 2020, when the pandemic began: it had primary surpluses, borrowed money during recessions or wars, and then returned it with primary surpluses — even without mechanisms or advice. There was a feeling, the culture inherited from the great Alexander Hamilton [one of the founders of the USA] of "let's pay our debts first and then do other things". You can support this with reputation or with institutions.
You can also pass with beautiful laws, debt brakes, advice or goals that everyone will ignore. Fiscal sustainability is institutionally and culturally difficult to achieve.
BBC News Brasil – But this credibility is given more by Standard & Poor's or whoever is governing the country?
Cochrane — That's an interesting question. I think Standard & Poor's reflects how the government runs the country. It's easy to talk about institutions, but details matter. The institution matters because whatever you do, it needs to survive management changes.
If the United States wants to convince people to keep the country's debt at low interest rates — something the president very much wants — then the country needs to commit to paying off the debt even when the next administration arrives, and the one after that, and the one after that. You can only convince people to maintain the debt if they believe that it will be paid not only by the current administration, but by those that will come in the coming decades.
This is why people generally place faith in institutional commitments that are more difficult to break. We were talking about Milei, in Argentina, for example, and I think his big problem is that Argentina is still a democracy. He can be kicked out of office and it is not obvious that whoever comes after him will follow the same fiscal and macroeconomic policies.
BBC News Brasil – But Argentina has a recent history of requesting loans from the IMF beyond the current president, and Milei himself did this.
Cochrane — This is the danger of the short term versus the long term. This is partially the situation in Brazil. If I could get lower interest rates, [the loans] would be more sustainable.
If you're facing a rollover crisis, like Argentina, if you need a little more, I don't know, $10 billion, then you could afford it without such high interest rates.
Greece was in the same situation. It is sustainable at low, not high, rates. Many countries say: "Let's just get a little more from the IMF to get through the situation." But of course it becomes a habit.
BBC News Brasil – A common argument in favor of the proposal is that high interest rates lead to high interest rates. As Brazil attracts short-term capital, due to carry trade, these resources leave the country quickly depending on global variations. When this happens, the real devalues, inflation rises, the Central Bank increases interest rates and, then, high interest rates attract the same capital. What is your analysis?
Cochrane — I thought it was a puzzle that Brazil's 9% real interest rate wasn't attracting more capital because, as you said, that rate should be — if it's a real interest rate and not a premium for some kind of [risk of] default or crisis or something like that — so attractive that capital should be coming in and pushing it to where it should be. So I'm skeptical about this stuff about short-term capital going back and forth across the country. In the end, it's still worth looking beyond money. Capital can only flow in boats and prices can change, but in the end, attracting capital is about attracting real investment, which is difficult to get back home.
The exchange rate [in Brazil] is very volatile. This is why investors are not flooding the country with long-term investments, which is what you need. Intervening in capital markets, in foreign exchange markets — unless it is dollarization — generally ends in stagnation.
BBC News Brasil — There are also those who point out that interest rates are high due to the profitability of the debt, much of which is fixed at the Selic rate. This is what they call "bolsa-rentismo", in reference to Bolsa Família.
Cochrane — Whenever we get into these discussions about transfers, about who loses and who wins, conspiracy theories about bad people, we lose our economic tracks. It's true that as long as this carousel keeps spinning, everyone who is earning 9% real returns is benefiting. So, if this is a real rate of return, ordinary Brazilians should save more [to benefit from the same return].
But on the other hand, they [who receive interest returns] are also taking a huge risk by financing a very risky government. Maybe we should even thank them for that. Inflation also has winners and losers, and if it grows, those same people will lose tons of money. It's risk and reward.
BBC News Brasil — Are there examples of countries that cut spending and saw effects on interest rates and inflation?
Cochrane — Argentina, recently. How did Milei stop inflation of 25% per month? He was very clear: we are going to solve the fiscal problem with the famous chainsaw.
Historically, the greatest examples of this were in the final moments of hyperinflation, such as Germany and Austria after the First World War, which resolved the fiscal problem and inflation in the blink of an eye. Interest rates fell and they were able to find money. They made their central banks more independent, but they did not do so in contexts of tight interest rates.
Governments that were not elected on the basis of fiscal austerity or a kind of "Swiss attitude" about debt repayment have a harder time doing this.
BBC News Brasil — But poverty has grown in Argentina. Jobs fell. Furthermore, a good part of the inflation was resolved by the very loans that Milei requested from the IMF. What exactly is the Argentine example in this case?
Cochrane — I don't want to get into a big debate about numbers. My impression was that the Argentine economy was doing well. I thought the poverty rate was falling, and to me, that's a success. Milei is encountering her own problems now, but in fact the only way out for all of us is a market-driven growth strategy. Brazil's GDP per capita is in the range of US$20 thousand [according to the World Bank, in 2025, it was US$10.7 thousand]. In the USA, it is US$90 thousand. Overcome this gap.
You wouldn't do this with industrial policies, state subsidies or things like that, but with radically open markets, open capital markets. Do what China did when it opened up a little and started growing like crazy. The same happened with Japan and South Korea. That's the recipe.
Milei started on this path and achieved some successes. There are limits to what a person can do within a political system, but we all know that this is the path that should be taken.
Credit, AFP via Getty Images
BBC News Brasil — Brazil has not recorded a positive nominal surplus in any year since redemocratization. However, until 2014, the country had robust primary surpluses, above 2% of GDP. Since then, the trajectory of public debt has accelerated, going from 63% of GDP that year to almost 83% now. Inflation, however, grew by around 5% per year, on average, except during the pandemic. Given these data, what does Brazil prove of your theory about inflation and interest rates?
Cochrane — As throughout the world, the large expenses of the pandemic were associated with the immense body of inflation, largely because it was not clear — in the US, in Europe, in the United Kingdom — how they would pay the debt. A large amount of money printed and borrowed is good if everyone trusts that it will be returned. I don't know what it was like in Brazil, but the US wasn't very responsible — and to this day they still have a lot to pay. The [American] inflation of 2021 and 2022 was exactly the type of event that the fiscal theory of the price level proves.
But why does inflation remain high in Brazil? The country has a history of reforms that sometimes work, especially fiscal or monetary reforms. The Real Plan produced years of primary surpluses, commitments to them, and low inflation. But it fell apart. I think people are worried about that.
I don't know exactly what this government's plans are, but there is a cliché that international investors always repeat — unless you convince them otherwise: that when left-wing governments return to power, they start spending money.
In fact, it's entirely possible for them to do just that. In the past, however, left-wing governments were the only ones to produce social consensus that we have to reform our spending programs. We have to convince people that they are paying the debt. Now, why did the real devalue 9% after the election? It's just that people have this in mind.
BBC News Brasil – But, in the case of Brazil, 90% of public expenses are mandatory. Is there room for robust adjustments, both in the country and in other economies facing this same dilemma, as the financial sectors demand?
Cochrane — Mandatory spending is mandatory until it’s not. It is mandatory until the money runs out. Didn't Brazil make a big spending cut in the 1990s? It's just that when the crisis gets intense enough, even what wasn't fixable before is fixed.
And there is an obligation on the other side too. Switzerland, especially the German part, has a debt brake, which is an obligation on what to do when it grows. In the US, mandatory spending must be authorized, but it is not repeated every year, and if the money runs out, Congress can change the law so that it is no longer mandatory. The structure and incentives of social programs are where there is a lot of dysfunction that can be fixed. It's not telling grandma that she's going to have to live on half the money she's used to. There's a lot to do without being cruel.
BBC News Brasil – Like what?
Cochrane — Maintain incentives for people to continue working. In many social programs, if you start working, you lose the benefit. I don't know if it happens in Brazil, but it's a danger.
Minimum wage adjustments for inflation are also problematic. Automatic adjustments are a bad idea in social programs. In most of these cases, it is not necessary to cut, but just stop the programs' readjustment rate. Fixing the structure and incentives of social programs would help people who really need it without breaking the government.
BBC News Brasil – In the case of Brazil, there is a consensus that indexing the minimum wage to inflation is a mechanism for controlling inequality.
Cochrane — You should get rid of the minimum wage. The minimum wage, characteristically, generates a great lack of employment, especially among the most vulnerable.
If you approve a minimum wage, who will you fire first to hire a young newbie who doesn't know what he's doing? Will it fire the single mother who needs flexible hours or, in the US, the immigrant who doesn't speak English very well? It harms the most vulnerable, who become unemployed or become informal, subject to all the difficulties of this work model. They move to favelas, etc. So, don't increase the minimum wage. Get rid of him.
BBC News Brasil — How much does the discussion about Brazil's case reflect on the international scene?
Cochrane — O mundo deve agradecer ao Brasil e à Argentina por conduzirem toda a sorte de experimentos em políticas fiscais e monetárias. Economistas norte-americanos deveriam prestar mais atenção neles, incluindo eu. Nosso curso de graduação em economia monetária deveria ser a história do Brasil e da Argentina, porque é tudo o que alguém precisa saber sobre isso em vários sentidos. Claro que alguns desses experimentos são muito infelizes.
Todo o mundo ocidental tem dividas públicas altas, gastos sociais que não podemos pagar, fertilidade baixa — que está minando o Estado de bem-estar social — e altas alíquotas de impostos marginais para arcar com esses custos, que produz grandes desincentivos, como os próprios programas sociais, que pagam para as pessoas não trabalharem. Essa estrutura está desmoronando em todos os lugares, e o Brasil está, como de costume, um passo à frente. Os Estados Unidos estão pagando apenas 5,5% de juros, com 100% de proporção da relação dívida/PIB e um superávit primário um pouco pior do que o do Brasil. Se nós chegarmos à mesma conjuntura do Brasil quando o governador [democrata da Califórnia] Gavin Newsom chegar à presidência, eu espero que o Brasil já tenha mostrado um jeito de sair disso — ou, então, pior, o Brasil terá novamente mostrado como não resolver o problema. Eu realmente espero que vocês façam a coisa certa pelo bem do resto do mundo.
Há outra opção. Provavelmente serei controverso aqui: a Argentina deveria se dolarizar, porque outra solução para o problema é simplesmente decidir não usar a sua própria moeda, mas a de outro. O dólar não está em ótima forma neste momento... É só um jeito de colocar uma questão monetária em conexão com a questão fiscal.
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