This Friday, May 1, the legal limit of 60 days to sustain a war without approval from the US Congress will be met, under the 1973 law that authorizes it with an emergency directive. However, the Donald Trump Administration argues that this deadline has not been met in Iran, due to the ongoing truce. How can the Government avoid the approval of the Legislature if it decides to resume the conflict? We address it.

First modification: 05/01/2026 - 14:32 Last modification: 05/01/2026 - 15:20

The Donald Trump Administration has opened a new front—this time legal and institutional—by maintaining that the war with Iran has ended and that, therefore, it is not obliged to submit to the 60-day limit established by the War Powers Resolution of 1973. The interpretation, defended by the White House and the Pentagon, comes at a critical moment: the expiration of the legal deadline coincides with a fragile truce in a conflict that continues to condition the stability of the Middle East and global energy markets.

The Executive's thesis is clear, but controversial: if there are no active combats, there are no "hostilities" in the strict legal sense, and therefore the legal counter stops. From there, the Administration concludes that it does not need authorization from Congress to maintain military operations related to the conflict.

The reinterpretation of war powers

The central axis of the White House argument lies in a functional redefinition of the term “hostilities.” According to senior officials cited by international agencies, the fact that no exchanges of fire have taken place since the ceasefire of April 7 implies that the war has entered an effective ending phase.

Along these lines, the Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, defended before the Senate that the ceasefire is not simply a diplomatic pause, but an element that alters the legal nature of the conflict. Under this interpretation, the 60-day period provided for in the law would be “suspended” while there are no active confrontations.

The Administration maintains that this reading is consistent with the original objective of the rule: to limit unauthorized active wars, not to regulate low intensity situations or temporary cessation of hostilities.

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The War Powers Resolution of 1973 was approved in a context of distrust of the Executive after the Vietnam War. Its objective was clear: prevent the president from engaging the United States in protracted conflicts without congressional oversight.

The rule establishes that the president can initiate military action in emergency situations, but must notify Congress and obtain authorization if operations extend beyond 60 days. In addition, it provides for an additional period of 30 days for the orderly withdrawal of troops.

However, the law does not precisely define what exactly constitutes “continued hostilities,” which has historically allowed for flexible interpretations by different administrations. The current case takes that ambiguity to its most extreme limit.

Read also "The greatest adversary we face are the defeatist words of the Democrats": Hegseth before the Senate

The “legal pause” argument and its implications

The Government maintains that the ceasefire in force since April 7 transforms the operational scenario. Since there is no active combat, the conflict would no longer fit into the assumption regulated by law, which would imply that the 60-day clock stops.

This interpretation introduces a novel element in American constitutional practice: the possibility of segmenting an armed conflict into differentiated legal phases, where truces not only have political or military effects, but also legal ones.

From the Executive's point of view, this approach provides strategic flexibility in a context in which indirect operations persist, such as the naval blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, which continues to have an impact on global energy trade.

The response from Congress has been largely critical. For Democratic legislators and some Republicans, the White House's interpretation empties the 1973 Resolution of its content.

Senator Susan Collins was one of the strongest voices in pointing out that the 60-day limit is not a political recommendation, but a binding legal obligation. According to this sector of the Legislature, accepting the Executive's thesis would mean converting the law into a mechanism that can be easily avoided through changes in the intensity of the conflict.

The debate is not minor: at stake is Congress's ability to control the use of military force abroad, one of the pillars of the American constitutional balance.

Read alsoCould the war in Iran become a prolonged and frozen conflict?: 'AJ'

A precedent of constitutional scope

Although the Administration claims that hostilities have ended, the reality on the ground suggests a more ambiguous situation. The ceasefire has reduced direct confrontation between the United States and Iran, but has not eliminated regional tensions.

The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, US naval operations and the persistence of parallel conflicts—especially in Lebanon—maintain a scenario of structural instability. Furthermore, recent episodes of defensive activity in Tehran show that the situation is far from full normalization.

In this context, the decision to declare the end of hostilities seems to respond to both a legal reading and a political and strategic need: to avoid an internal institutional blockade at a time of high international sensitivity.

Constitutional law experts warn that the interpretation defended by the White House could set a significant precedent. Lawyer Katherine Yon Ebright has pointed out that neither the text nor the logic of the 1973 Resolution contemplate the possibility of suspending the calculation of the deadline for a ceasefire.

In practice, accepting this criterion would open the door for future presidents to manage prolonged conflicts without legislative authorization, as long as they maintain intermittent phases of low intensity or tactical truces.

Even within the conservative political environment, alternative proposals have emerged, such as the idea of ​​formally redefining the military mission under new operational names, which would allow actions framed as self-defense to continue without activating traditional legal limits.

Read alsoAttacks and seizures: Hormuz consolidates itself as the new battlefield after extension of the truce

Between legality and geopolitics

Beyond the legal debate, the issue has direct implications for American foreign policy. The conflict with Iran has had immediate effects on energy markets, with strong fluctuations in the price of oil, and has reconfigured already fragile regional balances.

The White House strategy seems to seek a balance point: maintaining the capacity for military pressure without escalating into a formal war that forces Congress to intervene. However, this position increases internal institutional tension and leaves open the question of how far the interpretation of the legal framework can be stretched without eroding its original meaning.

It is an open conflict on two fronts. The war with Iran, although reduced in intensity, has moved to a dual terrain: the military, still active in the form of indirect operations, and the constitutional, where it is disputed who defines when a war begins, continues or ends.

At this crossroads, the Donald Trump Administration has opted for an expansive reading of executive power. Congress, for its part, is trying to reaffirm its role as a counterweight.

The result is a conflict that is no longer measured only in terms of armed confrontations, but also in the interpretation of the law that regulates its existence.

Read alsoTrump considers reducing US troops in Germany: how likely is it that he will carry out the threat?

With Reuters, AP and local media

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